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TOP SECRET
IDEALIST

25X1A

The IDEALIST Mission C136C as planned
herein is approved for 15 May 1966.

[REDACTED]

acting
Director of Special Activities

25X1A

[REDACTED]

Deputy Director for Science and Technology

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Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

[REDACTED]

Director of Central Intelligence

following

Ok for mission by Sec Def + Vance.

TOP SECRET
IDEALIST

Approved For Release 2000/04/13 : CIA-RDP68B00320R000100070104-0

JUSTIFICATION FOR COVERAGE OF TARGETS BY MISSION C136C

Monthly coverage of priority targets in South China, as well as weekly coverage of one-fourth of the priority targets, was directed by the United States Intelligence Board⁽¹⁾. The targets for South China are shown on the map, page four. The latter has been provided by COMOR⁽²⁾. Periodic coverage of the priority targets should provide the Intelligence Community with sufficient information concerning the Order of Battle in South China, from which the Intelligence Community could make a more accurate estimate of the ChiCom posture and intentions relative to the Vietnam situation.

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TARGET COVERAGE PLANNED FOR MISSION C136C

HIGHEST PRIORITY TARGETS:

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Hsi Meng Prob. Mil. Install
Chin Pien Mil. Area
Meng Tzu A/F, West
Meng Tzu Army Bks., So.
Meng Tzu Mil. Activity
Niv Wo Pai Motor Parks
Kai Yuan-Hq 13th Army
Ping Yuan Chieh A/F

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Wen Shan Army Bks. W.
Ma Li Po Supply Depot
Ha Giang Mil. Install.
Mi Hu Army Bks. Complex
Ssu Mao to Meng Tzu Road
Meng La Army Bks. West
Meng Peng Prob. Mil. Bks.

DATE OF LAST COVERAGE:

7 April 1966

MISSION DATA

DISTANCE : 1624
TIME : 4 + 15
DENIED TIME: 1 + 55
T/O FUEL : 1029
HI CONE : 190
ENTRY ALT : 69,200
PROFILE : MAX. ALT

BRIEF VULNERABILITY ESTIMATE:

The only known threat to this mission are MIG-21 aircraft in South China area. The MIG-21 capability against the U-2 at mission altitude is only marginal. Defensive electronic systems installed in the U-2 should prevent a successful intercept by an unknown SAM Site. (See MIG-21 Order of Battle on facing map.)


MIG-21

COORDINATION MESSAGES

1. Request for NPIC to search track for SAM Sites. (1)

2. NPIC's report of the search of latest photographs available along the mission route for SAM sites. (2)

3. Mission details coordinated with [REDACTED] (3) 25X1C

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4. [REDACTED] approval of the mission. (4)

5. Mission details coordinated with JRC/JCS. (5)

6. Intelligence summary of AOB, ROB, GOB in the area of the mission. (6)

7. Mission details coordinated with RTG if required. (7)

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8. [REDACTED] approval of the mission if required. (8)

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1. [REDACTED] 30
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED] 22, [REDACTED] 0028
4. [REDACTED] 0049
5. OPCEN 0019, OPCEN 0020
6. [REDACTED] 0024
7. [REDACTED] 0022
8. [REDACTED] 6500.

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14 May, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

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SUBJECT: Internal Mission Approval for [REDACTED] Mission C136C
of 15 May 1966.

25X1A 1. At 1100 hours, 14 May, I picked up the Black Book for Mission C136C in the OSA Control Center, together with the mission folder on Mission C126C, flown last night, and proceeded to the Director's Office where I met with [REDACTED] Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, to obtain his signature for C136C.

25X1A 2. I went over in some detail with [REDACTED] the events of Mission C126C, and especially the information then in hand regarding the SA-2 activity in the Kunming area, where the aircraft was reportedly attacked by several missiles from an area where the NPIC SAM search had been performed with negative results. I showed him [REDACTED] 7287 and [REDACTED] 7295 which contained details on ECM system performance, pilot's observations and evasive maneuvers. We both informally concluded that in all probability the SA-2s came from Chicom mobile SAM installation(s). I explained to [REDACTED] that C136C was designed to complement the coverage of C126C, and that if it was successfully flown, that should wrap up Southwest China highest priority targets for at least another month or so. He then signed for the mission.

25X1A 3. In company with [REDACTED] we then called on Mr. Richard Helms, DDCI, in his office, to obtain his signoff for the Director. [REDACTED] and I once again went over the details of C126C, stressing the SAM mobility idea. I said that if the Chicoms did fire two or three missiles at Kunming and missed, unless they were different than we in the same circumstance, there might well be a post mortem examination of what went wrong, which might make it unlikely that they would immediately roll that capability down the road to Meng Tzu, to be ready to try it again tonight. We did admit, however, that there was no way of telling if they had a different SAM battery at Meng Tzu than the one at Kunming. As for a coordinated attack at Meng Tzu between SA-2s and MIG-21s, I said that I discounted this possibility, since the Chicoms might nail one of their own birds. Yet it would be attractive to be able to distract the U-2 pilot with one or the other capability, and then when he was turning and losing altitude, hit him with the other.

25X6 4. Mr. Helms said that in view of the recent dust-up over the MIG shootdown in China by U.S. aircraft and the political noise level arising therefrom, he felt that he should not contribute a possible added static element (arising from a shootdown) to the pot without first running it by Secretary McNamara. [REDACTED]

5. Mr. Helms then (1150 hours) placed a call to the Secretary of Defense to discuss the matter. Mr. McNamara was not available, so Mr. Helms spoke with Secretary Vance, repeating the substance of paragraph four above, mentioning the success of Mission Cl26C (but not discussing the SA-2 input) and the fact that Cl36C had a mathematical chance of adding to the noise level if anything went sour. Mr. Vance said that he was lunching with Secretary McNamara in a few minutes, and together they would discuss the matter and report back. Mr. Helms explained that he was leaving the office, and asked Mr. Vance to call [REDACTED] in the DCI's office when they had a position to report.

6. I then joined [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of COMOR in [REDACTED] office to await word from Secretary Vance. Promptly at 1230 hours, Mr. Vance called [REDACTED] and said that he and Secretary McNamara had gone over the problem, and it was their joint view that the [REDACTED] mission should proceed. [REDACTED] then signed the Black Book for both the DDCI and the DCI as he had been given approval to do by Mr. Helms on receipt of favorable word from the Pentagon. I told [REDACTED] that I would make a memo for the record of the whole transaction, which this document represents.

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM/UR.
Acting Director of Special Activities
DPS&T

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